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Case No. 20090559 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
Wolf gango Ruiz, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner 
The following points are submitted in response to arguments raised in 
Defendant Ruiz's brief. For those matters not expressly addressed, the State relies 
on the arguments made in its opening brief. 
Reply to Defendant's Point LA. 
KENTUCKY V. PADILLA DOES NOT MOOT THE ISSUES RAISED 
ON CERTIORARI 
After the State filed its opening brief, the United States Supreme Court issued 
Kentucky v. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). That decision placed an affirmative duty 
on defense counsel to accurately advise a noncitizen client of the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea, when those consequences are "truly clear" under 
immigration law. Id. at 1483. Ruiz argues that Padilla renders the questions on 
certiorari moot. Br. Aple. 15-20. Ruiz is incorrect. 
"A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants/' State v. Lane, 2009 UT 35, «| 18, 212 P.3d 529 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, an "appeal is moot if during the 
pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, 
thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." Id, (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 'The burden of persuading the court that an 
issue is moot lies with the party asserting mootness." Salt Lake County v. Holliday 
Water Co., 2010 UT 45, | 21, 658 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
As explained below, Padilla does not eliminate the controversy raised by the 
State on certiorari, or otherwise render "the relief requested impossible or of no 
legal effect." Lane, 2009 UT 35, f^ 18. It therefore does not render this appeal moot. 
Before Padilla, Utah law—like the law in many jurisdictions—held that 
defense counsel had no affirmative duty to advise clients of the adverse deportation 
consequences of guilty pleas. See State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, f 20,125 P.3d 
930. See also Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1484 (and cases cited therein) and id. at 1491-92 (J. 
Alito, concurring in the judgment). The underlying rationale for the former rule 
was that deportation was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and that counsel 
does not perform deficiently by failing to advise a client of a plea's collateral 
consequences. See Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, ^ 20. But while criminal defense 
2 
counsel was not required to advise noncitizen clients of adverse deportation 
consequences, defense counsel performed deficiently if he affirmatively 
misrepresented those consequences. Id. at % f 20-21. In other words, before Padilla, 
defense counsel did not perform deficiently by remaining silent regarding the 
deportation consequences of a plea; but if counsel did not remain silent, his advice 
had to be correct. See id. 
Padilla broadened defense counsel's duty by holding that competent counsel 
can no longer remain silent regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, 
when those consequences are "truly clear" under immigration law. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. 
at 1483. Rather, when those consequences are "truly clear," defense counsel now 
has an affirmative duty to accurately advise a noncitizen client of those 
consequences. Id. However, when immigration law is not "succinct and 
straightforward," the duty is "more limited." Id. Then, "a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Id. 
But the analysis both pre- and post-P adilla does not end there. Whether a 
criminal defense counsel has accurately advised a noncitizen client on the 
deportation consequences of a guilty plea goes only to whether counsel performed 
deficiently under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove ineffective 
assistance of counsel in this context, the noncitizen defendant must prove not only 
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that his counsel performed deficiently, but also that his counsel's silence or 
erroneous advice prejudiced him. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1486-87. As Ruiz 
concedes, to prove prejudice, the noncitizen defendant must show that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial/7 Br. Aple. 16 (quoting Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
Relying on Padilla, Ruiz argues that he "easily meets both Strickland 
requirements/' Br. Aple. 16. Ruiz reasons that Padilla therefore mandates reversal 
of Judge Skanchy's order, and, thereby renders the issues before this Court moot. 
Id. at 15-20. Padilla, however, neither answers the questions before this Court, nor 
eliminates the controversy between the parties. 
The primary question on certiorari review is whether "the court of appeals 
erred in vacating the district court judge's reconsideration of a prior judge's 
decision, thereby reinstating the prior decision." Irrespective of Padilla, this Court 
must answer that question before it can be determined whether Ruiz is entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea. If the court of appeals correctly held that Judge Skanchy 
abused his discretion in taking more evidence and reversing Judge Fuchs, Ruiz will 
be entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, % 15,210 
P.3d 955. This is because Judge Fuchs's order allowing Ruiz to withdraw his plea 
would stand. See id. 
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But if—as the State contends—the court of appeals erred and Judge Skanchy 
did not abuse his discretion, Padilla does not mandate reversing Judge Skanchy's 
order not allowing Ruiz to withdraw his plea. See 251:36; Rl60-63. As stated, Padilla 
holds that counsel performs deficiently if counsel doei not accurately advise his 
noncitizen client of "truly clear" adverse deportation consequences. Padilla, 130 
S.Ct at 1483. Under Padilla, counsel fails in this duty either by remaining silent or 
by affirmatively misadvising the client. See id. at 1483. Ruiz alleged below not that 
his counsel stood silent, but that his counsel affirmatively misadvised him. R56,59-
65, 70-73. Ruiz's affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw his plea claimed 
that his counsel told him that he would not be deported. R70. Plea counsel agreed 
that he did not remain silent, but disputed that his deportation advice was 
erroneous. See R116-17. Plea counsel testified that he repeatedly told Ruiz that he 
would "almost certainly be deported." R251:20-22. Ruiz has not shown that this 
advice was incorrect under "truly clear" immigration law. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 
1483. 
Thus, whether Ruiz's counsel performed deficiently depends not on Padilla, 
but on whom the trial court believed. Here, Judge Skanchy credited counsel's 
testimony over Ruiz's affidavit to find that counsel did not misadvise Ruiz on the 
deportation consequences of his plea. So long as that finding is undisturbed, Padilla 
does not mandate reversing Judge Skanchy's order. 
5 
In any event, it is not clear that Padilla would apply to Ruiz. Counsel's 
performance is judged at the time of the alleged error and based on his or her 
"perspective at the time." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,523 (2003). See also State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1228 (Utah 1993). At the time Ruiz entered his plea, the law in 
Utah and elsewhere was that counsel had no duty to advise a noncitizen client of the 
immigration consequences of a plea; counsel's only duty in that regard was to not 
affirmatively misadvise. See Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, % 20. 
Also, Padilla by its express terms applies only to advice regarding the adverse 
deportation or removal consequences of a plea. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480-84. In this 
case, Ruiz seems to suggest that his counsel's alleged misadvice related not to the 
deportation consequences of his plea, but to its adverse affect on his ability to adjust 
his status "to lawful permanent resident alien." Br. Aple. 18-19. 
Finally, Padilla involved a legal alien. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1477. An illegal alien 
can hardly show prejudice where his illegal status constitutes an independent basis 
for deportation. Ruiz asserts in his brief that he "legally entered the United States." 
Br. Aple. 6. To support this claim, he attaches extra-record immigration documents 
in his Addendums G and H. Because this Court's review "is limited to only those 
materials contained in the record," it must disregard those documents. Tillman v. 
State, 2005 UT 56, n.5,128 P.3d 1123. See also State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 39, 
163 P.3d 695. But even if Ruiz entered this country legally, he does not deny or 
6 
dispute that he remained here illegally or that he told his counsel that he was in this 
country illegally at the time he pled guilty. See R251:20-21. Nor does he explain 
how his counsel's advice that his plea would "almost certainly" result in 
deportation was either incorrect or prejudiced him uhder Padilla. If Ruiz was 
willing to plead guilty believing that he would "almost certainly" be deported based 
on his plea, he cannot show that if his counsel had told him otherwise that he would 
not have pled guilty. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
In sum, Padilla does not render the questions before this Court moot. 
Reply to Defendant's Point LB 
A TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS OR 
ARTICULATE REASONS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN 
AUTOMATIC REVERSAL 
Ruiz agrees that "a trial judge's failure to make findings or articulate reasons 
does not ordinarily warrant automatic reversal.'" Br. Aplt. 20 (quoting State's Brf. 
17 and citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316 (Utah 1998) and State v. Pecht, 
2002 UT 41,134,48 P.3d 931) (emphasis omitted). Ruiz disagrees, however, that the 
court of appeals held this. Br. Aple. 21,26. Ruiz contend^ that the court of appeals 
reversed, not because Judge Skanchy did not articulate his findings, but because the 
record as a whole did not support his findings. Br. Aplt, 21, 26. 
Ruiz misreads the court of appeals' opinion, which clearly reversed solely 
because Judge Skanchy did not articulate his reasons for hearing Mr. Otto's 
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testimony. See Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, ^ 14. After correctly stating the general 
rule—that"trial judges generally are not required to give reasons for discretionary 
rulings"—the court of appeals stated that "[w]hen a second judge announces a 
reversal of a prior judge's order, it is doubly important for the second judge to 
articulate a reason for the change/7 Id. The court of appeals then noted that "Judge 
Skanchy did not articulate why he was allowing the State to present new evidence, 
after the State had been given multiple opportunities to present such evidence and 
after Judge Fuchs had rebuffed the State's request for yet a further opportunity to do 
so."1 Id. After reiterating that "it was especially incumbent on Judge Skanchy to 
explain why a change was in order," the court of appeals concluded its analysis 
with, "Absent such an explanation on the record, we have no assurance that the 
change was not merely a function of personal preference on Judge Skanchy's part." 
Id. Other than noting that pre-sentence motions to withdraw a plea should be 
"liberally granted," the foregoing was the sum total of the court of appeals' analysis. 
Id. at t | 11-14. 
1
 As noted in the State's opening brief, this statement is incorrect. In fact, the 
prosecutor had been given only one prior opportunity to present evidence—at the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea held by Judge Fuchs. See State's Brf., 2-
7,8 n.5. Moreover, while Judge Fuchs "rebuffed" the prosecutor's initial attempt to 
continue the hearing to call plea counsel to testify, Judge Fuchs did not "rebuff" the 
prosecutor's later motion to reconsider and take counsel's testimony. Rather, over 
Ruiz's written objection, Judge Fuchs set the matter for hearing. R122-28,136,137-
42,144,161. 
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The foregoing statements lead inexorably to the conclusion that the court of 
appeals reversed Judge Skanchy—not because his decision was incorrect or an 
abuse of discretion—but merely because he did not explain "on the record" why he 
was allowing the State to put on additional evidence. See id. at f^ 14. 
Ruiz nevertheless suggests that the court of appeals properly reversed 
because the record did not "patently" support Judge Skanchy's decision to allow the 
State to put on plea counsel Otto's testimony. Br. Aple. £1-26. In so arguing, Ruiz 
agrees that under this Court's precedent, a judge's discretionary ruling should not 
be reversed for a failure to articulate supporting reasons on the record, where those 
reasons are apparent on the face of the record. See id.; see ulso State's Brf. 22-25 (and 
cases cited therein). 
Ruiz, however, fails to recognize that before reversing, the court of appeals 
never looked to the record to see if it supported Judge Skanchy's decision to take 
Otto's testimony. Rather, the court of appeals based its reversal solely on Judge 
Skanchy's failure to state his supporting reasons for the evidentiary hearing on the 
record. See Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, |% 11-14. Moreover, cts explained in the State's 
opening brief, the record here clearly supports Judge Skanchy's decision, where (1) 
Judge Fuchs had already set the matter for hearing over Ruiz's objection, and (2) Mr. 
Otto's affidavit, if true, suggested that a fraud had been committed on the trial 
court. See State's Brf., 25-29. 
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Ruiz also fails to acknowledge the State's cited authority that even when the 
record does not patently support a trial court's discretionary ruling, the remedy is 
not outright reversal, but a remand to allow the trial court to put its reasons on the 
record. See State's Brf. 24-25, 29-30 (citing Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320, 
323 (Utah 1991); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-94 (Utah App. 1991); and City of 
Phoenix v. Geyler, 697 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1985)). Thus, rather than reversing 
Judge Skanchy for failing to put his reasons for the evidentiary hearing on the 
record, the court of appeals should have remanded to allow him to complete his 
findings. 
In sum, given that Judge Skanchy's reasons for holding the evidentiary 
hearing were apparent on the face of the record, the court of appeals should have 
affirmed. But even if those reasons were not apparent on the face of the record, the 
remedy is not to simply reverse as suggested by Ruiz. See Br. Aple. 20-26. Rather, it 
is to remand for the trial court to state its reasons on the record and complete its 
findings. See Neerings, 817 P.2d at 323 (failure to state grounds for decision not 
reversible error; rather "in an appropriate case, failure to do so may only justify 
remand to the trial court"). 
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Reply to Defendant's Point II.B\ 
JUDGE SKANCHY DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN 
TAKING COUNSEL'S TESTIMONY AND RECONSIDERING THE 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW IN LIGHT OF THAT TESTIMONY 
Ruiz presents three reasons why the court of appeals properly held Judge 
Skanchy abused his discretion in re-opening the evidence and reconsidering his 
motion to withdraw in light of that evidence. Br. Aple. 3&-40. The court of appeals, 
however, relied on none of these reasons. To the extent that Ruiz presents these 
reasons as an alternative basis for affirming the court of appeals, they are 
unpersuasive. 
A, Judge Skanchy had discretion to re-open the evidence and 
reconsider the motion to withdraw in light of that evidence. 
Ruiz first argues that Judge Skanchy "erred in entertaining a motion to 
reconsider when Utah law specifically frowns against such a procedural motion." 
Br. Aple. 33 (citing Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24,135 P.3d 861). He then asserts that if 
anything, the State's motion is more properly construed as a motion under rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud. 
Id. He thus reasons that Judge Skanchy could not properly consider the State's 
motion absent proof that Ruiz perpetrated a fraud on th£ court. Id. 
Ruiz misapprehends Utah law on this point. Like inost motions, motions to 
reconsider are not expressly "recognized" in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, f 15, 163 P.3d 615. Nevertheless, 
"motions to or decisions by the district court to reconsider or revise nonfinal 
judgments, . . . are sanctioned by our rules." Gillett, 2006 UT 24, f 10 (emphasis 
added). Although Ruiz argues otherwise, Judge Fuchs's order allowing him to 
withdraw his guilty plea was a nonfinal order. In criminal cases, "it is the sentence 
itself which constitutes a final judgment." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,886 (Utah 
1978). Once Ruiz was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, the prosecution began 
anew as if the plea had never happened. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 957 P.2d 595,596-97 
(Utah 1998); see also State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 11, 975 P.2d 476 (by 
withdrawing guilty plea, defendant "by his own hand, defeated his expectation of 
finality"). Moreover, because a final judgment had not yet been entered, Judge 
Fuchs was free to revisit his order at any time. Cf. State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, 
Iff 20-23,128 P.3d 1 (holding that trial court could reverse its decision to accept 
guilty plea up until it signed and entered final judgment). And here, Judge Fuchs 
had begun reconsideration when he set the matter for further hearing before he 
retired. 
Ruiz is also mistaken that the prosecution's motion is more properly viewed 
as a rule 60(b) motion, although the prosecutor did style his motion as such. See 
R105-113. Rule 60(b), by its terms, generally applies to final judgments and not to a 
request to reconsider an interim, nonfinal order. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (a "court may 
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in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal Representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding . . .") (emphasis added). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 
55(b) (providing that trial court may set aside nonfinal entry of default for "good 
cause shown/7 but that if judgment by default has been entered, rule 60(b) applies). 
As stated, Judge Fuchs's order allowing Ruiz to withdraw his plea was not a final 
judgment or order. But more to the point, the motion itself asked for nothing more 
than that Judge Fuchs reconsider his initial refusal to re-open the evidence and hear 
Otto's testimony and then reconsider his order allowing Ruiz to withdraw his plea 
in light of Otto's affidavit and anticipated testimony. See R105-113. Thus, the State's 
motion was truly a motion to reconsider a nonfinal order, which, as explained, is 
both allowed and sanctioned by our rules. See Gillett, 20106 UT 24, f 10. 
Additionally, contrary to Ruiz's contention, the prosecution was not required 
to prove fraud before either Judge Fuchs or Judge Skancthy could reconsider that 
nonfinal order. As explained in the State's opening Ibrief, a judge is free to 
reconsider a nonfinal order at any time before final judgment for a variety of 
reasons, which may or may not include fraud. See State's Brf. 18-21. Of course, as 
also explained in the State's opening brief, Otto's affidavit, while not conclusive 
proof, raised the specter that a fraud had been committed]on the court and thereby 
justified re-opening the evidence to inquire into the matter. State's Brf. 26-29. 
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B. The prosecutor's personal problems are irrelevant to whether Judge 
Skanchy abused his discretion, 
Ruiz contends that Judge Skanchy abused his discretion by failing to take into 
account that the prosecutor's negligence might have been attributable to the 
prosecutor's "potential or alleged cocaine problem." Br. Aple. 37-38. As Ruiz did in 
both the trial court and the court of appeals, he asserts that long after Judge Skanchy 
entered his order vacating the withdrawal of the guilty plea, but before Ruiz's 
sentencing, the prosecutor in this case was charged with possession of cocaine. Id. 
Judge Skanchy properly recognized that Ruiz failed to establish a causal 
connection between the prosecutor's alleged cocaine possession and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to consider. R2525-7. Moreover, other than Ruiz's 
unsupported allegations in his motion to arrest judgment, there is nothing in the 
record concerning the prosecutor's alleged arrest or cocaine use. See R201-19. 
Consequently, Ruiz's brief contains no record citations to support this claim. See Br. 
Aple. 37-38. Ruiz instead relies solely on a citation to a newspaper article and his 
own unsupported allegations. See id. at 38 n.23. As discussed, this Court may 
consider only those matters appearing the record. See Tillman, 2005 UT 56 n.5; 
Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, | 39. But, in any event, even assuming that the 
prosecutor was arrested for and charged with cocaine possession, Judge Skanchy 
correctly concluded that fact had no bearing on the validity of Ruiz's plea or on the 
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correctness of any of the court's prior rulings. Undoubtedly, this was the reason 
that the court of appeals did not rely on this ground to Reverse Judge Skanchy. 
C. The record does not support Ruiz's claim that the prosecutor 
engaged in forum shopping. 
Ruiz argues that granting the motion to reconsider violated due process and 
gave the State an unfair advantage over him by allowing the prosecutor to forum 
shop and re-litigate. Br. Aple. 38-39. 
The record does not support Ruiz's forum-shopping claim. The prosecutor 
did not file his motion to reconsider with another judge, He filed the motion with 
Judge Fuchs, the same judge who issued the ruling he wahted revisited. R99; R105. 
Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecutor delayed filing the motion for the 
purpose of having another judge hear it. Indeed, the prosecutor filed the motion 
only 9 days after the trial court entered the order granting the motion to withdraw. 
R99,105. Nor does anything in the record suggest that the prosecutor knew that 
Judge Fuchs would retire before deciding the motion To the contrary, the 
prosecutor sought and obtained a hearing date on the motion from Judge Fuchs. 
R105,113,136. Although the prosecutor asked Judge FUCIJLS for a continuance based 
on a scheduling conflict, the record contains no evidence ^hat the continuance was 
sought for the purpose of getting the matter before a different judge. R137. In short, 
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Ruiz cites no record evidence that supports his assertion that the prosecutor 
engaged in forum shopping.2 
Ruiz cites State v. Redd, 2001UT113,37 P.3d 1160, to support his claim that his 
due process rights were violated by allowing the prosecutor to re-litigate the motion 
to withdraw. Br. Aple. 39-40. Redd, which belongs to the Brickey line of cases, is 
inapposite. Brickey held that "due process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from 
refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the 
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or 
that other good cause justifies refiling/' State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 
1986). See also Redd, 2001 UT 113, % 13. 
But the "Brickey rule is a narrow one/' and "only 'limits a prosecutor's ability 
to refile a previously dismissed charge!" State v. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, \ 5,180 P.3d 
2
 Ruiz gives two record cites—R.252, at 5-6, and R. 203-219—as support for his 
assertion that "the State knew full well in advance that Judge Fuchs was preparing 
to retire when they filed the 'motion to reconsider7 and that the case would be re-
assigned to another judge." Br. Aple. 40. Those citations are only to Ruiz's 
unsupported allegations below that the prosecutor forum shopped. Neither citation 
establishes nor supports that the prosecutor in fact did. The first cite is to counsel's 
unsupported assertion at sentencing that the prosecution filed its motion to re-open 
after Judge Fuchs retired. R252:5-6. But, in fact, the prosecution filed its motion 
before Judge Fuchs retired and Judge Fuchs set it for hearing after Ruiz responded. 
See R105,119,122,136. The second cite is to Ruiz's memorandum in support of his 
motion to arrest judgment. That memo cited no evidence that the prosecutor knew 
before filing the motion to reconsider that Judge Fuchs would retire before hearing 
the motion. 
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186 (quoting State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85,19,151 P.3d 171) (emphasis added in Zahn). 
Here, no charge has been dismissed or ref iled. Rather, the trial court merely granted 
the State's single motion to reconsider a ruling that allowed Ruiz to withdraw his 
plea. 
Allowing the prosecution to later present Mr. Otto's testimony—even though 
Judge Fuchs had originally refused to—does not violate due process or work any 
unfairness on Ruiz. Due process does not insulate a ruling obtained by factual 
misrepresentations from further review when those misrepresentations come to 
light. Due process guarantees only that a defendant will be subjected to a fair 
process. There is nothing unfair in a process that allows a court to correct a ruling 
originally based on a defendant's factual misrepresentations. Indeed, such a process 
is inherently fair. Cf. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, f 9,31 P.3d 543 (law of 
the case doctrine should not be applied so as "to promote efficiency at the expense 
of the greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise precedent"). 
In sum, as explained above and in the State's opening brief, Judge Skanchy 
did not abuse his discretion in taking Otto's testimony and revisiting the motion to 
withdraw in light of that testimony. It is true that the prosecutor here was clearly 
derelict in his duty to timely present Otto's testimony. Both Judge Fuchs and Judge 
Skanchy, therefore, would have been well within their discretion to refuse to re-
open the evidence and reconsider the motion to withdraw. But faced with 
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subsequent allegations that Ruiz had fraudulently obtained the prior order to 
withdraw, they were also well within their discretion to overlook the prosecutor's 
negligence in favor of ascertaining the truth. See Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, f 54,184 
P.3d 1126 ("The justice system is not a sporting event in which each side has a right 
to exploit every tactical advantage available/7); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91,94 (Utah 
1982) (recognizing that criminal trial process is more than "a game" and that its 
"primary purpose . . . is the vindication of the laws of a civilized society against 
those who are guilty of transgressing those laws"). Given the concerns raised by 
plea counsel's affidavit and the trial court's interest in ensuring that no fraud had 
been perpetrated, the court of appeals erred in finding any abuse of discretion in 
inquiring into the matter. 
Reply to Defendant's Point III 
PADILLA DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT PRE-SENTENCE 
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA BE "LIBERALLY 
GRANTED" 
Ruiz disagrees with the State's analysis in its opening brief on why the 
"liberally granted" language appearing in prior Utah cases has been superseded by 
statute. See Br. Aple. 40-41, and 26-30. The State's opening brief adequately 
addresses Ruiz's arguments on this point, except as to his claim that Padilla "calls on 
the lower courts to be flexible in adjudicating motions to withdraw pleas by non-
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citizen defendants and predicated on [ineffective assistance7' ground[s]." Br. Aple. 
50,44-46,48. 
The majority opinion in Padilla contains no such call. Rather, the language 
Ruiz cites to. is found in Justice Alito's concurring opinion. See Br. Aple. 27-28,44, 
48; Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Ruiz overreads 
Justice Alito's comments, which were made in roundly criticizing the majority's 
adoption of a "rigid constitutional rule." Padilla, at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Justice Alito, who would have instead adopted the rule in Rojas-
Martinez, argued that the majority's new broad rule "could inadvertently head off 
more promising ways of addressing the underlying problem—such as statutory or 
administrative reforms requiring trial judges to inform a defendant on the record 
that a guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences." Id. Justice Alito 
further noted that such "flexible statutory procedures for withdrawing guilty pleas 
might give courts appropriate discretion to determine whether the interests of 
justice would be served by allowing a particular defendant to withdraw a plea 
entered into on the basis of incomplete information." Id. 
In other words, neither the Padilla majority nor Justice Alito called upon 
courts to adopt more "flexible" procedures for withdrawing guilty pleas. Rather, 
Justice Alito faulted the majority for adopting a rule that might discourage states 
from adopting more flexible statutory or administrative procedures. 
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But regardless of whether a state statute should be more flexible in allowing a 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, as explained in the State's opening brief, 
Utah's statute is clear. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea only upon "a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(2). "Liberality" plays no part in Utah's statutory analysis. The court of appeals 
erred in holding otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted August lZr\ 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
.LAURA B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on August f£, 2010, two copies of the foregoing reply brief were 
fy mailed • hand-delivered to: 
Hakeem Ishola 
Ishola Law Firm, P.C. 
716 East 4500 South, Suite N142 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
A digital copy of the reply brief was also included: IM Yes D No :BY< 
JVV&.1 >j^<dr\Ltfj\ 
